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ABSTRACT 
 
As patents and other forms of intellectual property become more pervasive in the 
next generation of biotechnologies, designing polices and practices to ensure sufficient 
freedom to operate (i.e., the ability to practice or use an innovation) will be crucial for 
non-profit agencies in the developed and developing world, especially those intent on 
developing improved seed varieties and other technologies destined for commercial 
release. Are non-profits exempt from intellectual property claims? What constitutes 
infringement of a patent? How does a non-profit establish its freedom to operate? We 
address these issues in this paper and evaluate various options for accessing other 
people’s technologies. Options include cross-licensing agreements, research-only or cost-
free licenses, market segmentation strategies, mergers or joint ventures, and patent 
pooling or clearinghouse mechanisms. Responding creatively to the new intellectual 
property environment will have far reaching consequences for the future of non-profit 
research. 
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Interest in intellectual property no longer belongs just to the private-sector realm 
of inventors, authors, artists, and the firms that deal in their output.  Public and private 
non-profit institutions around the world are becoming increasingly evident on the 
intellectual property scene, interacting more closely with the for-profit sector and even 
spawning private entities of their own.   
Universities have traditionally been considered ivory-tower institutions and 
bastions of “pure” academic pursuits, but they are increasingly active in claims for 
patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual properties.  For example, from the 
years 1981-1985, a total of 1,887 United States patents was awarded to inventors who 
assigned their rights to entities containing the word “University” in its name, comprising 
only 0.59 percent of total United States patents during these years.  From 1986-1990, this 
number increased to 4,027 or 0.96 percent, from 1991-1995, to 7,314 or 1.47 percent and 
from 1996-2000 to 13,940 or 2.15 percent of total patents awarded.  At least some of this 
increase may be attributed to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which mandated that the United 
States Government cede ownership of intellectual property, emanating from government-
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sponsored research, to the recipient institution (Mowery et al. 2001).  Notably absent 
from the group of non-profit institutes that seek patent protection are the Centers that 
form the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR, or CG for 
short).  Of these 16 Centers, located primarily in developing countries, only a few have 
obtained patent protection for their inventions (Binenbaum, et al. 2001). 
Non-profit research institutions are not in the business of selling products to 
consumers.  If they are to realize a return on their investment (rather than make it 
available gratis), they essentially have to sell rights to their technologies to commercial 
entities or other research institutions.  For example, the technologies may be exclusively 
out-licensed to a commercial partner or form the basis for a company that is spun off 
from the institute.  Alternatively, an institution may choose to out-license the technology 
itself on a non-exclusive basis.  Some highly publicized patents have been licensed in this 
manner, generating a very substantial income for the host institution.  For example, in 
1997, Stanford University received over $43 million from licensing the now-expired 
Boyer-Cohen patent, which represented over half of its total licensing income. 
The importance of licensing and technology transfer for non-profit organizations 
is also reflected in the large membership of the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM).  AUTM represents over 300 universities, research institutes and 
teaching hospitals mostly from the United States and Canada.  In a recent licensing 
survey conducted by AUTM (1999), 190 United States and Canadian universities, 
teaching hospitals, research institutes, and patent commercialization companies reported 





that over 340 new companies based on an academic discovery were formed in 1999, and 
over 18,600 licenses and options were active, up 9 percent over 1998.  Moreover, the 
adjusted gross license income received was $862 million.   
Non-profits also receive substantial funding from the private commercial sector.  
In the same AUTM survey, industry-supported research increased 13 percent over 1998 
to $2.7 billion.  This money may or may not be encumbered with intellectual property 
constraints, such as an obligation to license or assign resulting technology and inventions 
back to the funding agency.   
For all these benefits that non-profit institutions receive from intellectual 
property, these same institutes are notorious for using other people’s patented 
technologies without permission.  A review of the intellectual property policies of several 
large universities in the United States with very active licensing offices reveals that none 
discusses the need to obtain permission to use patented methods and materials and only 
one presented guidelines on copying material that is copyright protected.  All the policies 
focused on the university’s rights to inventions, the procedures that researchers need to 
follow to inform the university of an invention, and the distribution of licensing income.  
Very little factual information about intellectual property rights is provided in these 
policy documents.  Thus, in their intellectual property policies non-profit institutions 
appear to be concerned mostly, if not exclusively, with generating income, and are 
neglecting internal monitoring and compliance with respect to other people’s 
technologies.  In contrast, for-profit entities, especially in biotechnology, are not only 





in obtaining licenses, options for licenses, or collaborations that will assure them of 
“freedom to operate” (i.e., the ability to use or practice an invention).  For-profits are also 
usually less interested in generating income from a particular piece of intellectual 
property; they are more interested in developing a suite of intellectual property that 
supports their final product.   
Despite widespread belief to the contrary, however, non-profit organizations are 
not immune to intellectual property laws.  There is no general research exemption from 
infringement, and the exemptions in the United States, for example, are very limited and 
based in statutes.
4  Non-profit research organizations need to develop and implement 
policies to make decisions regarding use of other people’s technologies.  Without such 
policies, researchers and investigators will continue to be confused about patent laws, act 
inappropriately and propagate misinformation, possibly subjecting their host institution to 
financial liability or damage to their reputations.   
With a special emphasis on agricultural biotechnology, this article discusses 
policies of intellectual property protection, de jure and de facto research exemptions, and 
the ways that research at non-profit institutes fit with and are at odds with these policies 
and exemptions.  We also present an overview of the steps necessary to abide by other’s 
intellectual property rights and show how most non-profits are ill-equipped to undertake 
such measures.  Consequences of ignorance or inaction of a non-profit are presented as a 
risk analysis.  Finally, we present strategies for pursuing different options of obtaining 
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rights to use other people’s technologies with special emphasis on the international 
implications of these issues.   
2.  FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
Over the past few decades, there has been a proliferation of intellectual property 
emanating from agricultural technologies and the sciences that generate these 
technologies.  By way of background to our discussion of intellectual property options for 
non-profit institutions, we provide a brief description of the various forms of legal 
protection used to protect agricultural technologies, seeds, and the science that gives rise 
to these technologies.  
The major forms of legal protection available for agricultural biotechnology are 
patents, Plant Breeders’ Rights (known in the United States as Plant Variety Protection 
Certificates), trademarks, and contracts.  Trademarks, however, have relatively little 
impact on non-profit institutions and so will not be discussed here.  Protecting and 
controlling the use of intellectual property can also be achieved by technical means, like 
hybridization of crops such as corn and rice, and genetic use restriction technologies 
(GURTs).  These methods have the greatest impact on farmers by rendering the seed 
unsuitable for replanting or suppressing the expression of certain introduced traits in 
saved seed.  They are not discussed here, but are dealt with in detail by 
UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA (1999). 
A web of proprietary claims now envelops the transfer and use of patented 
biotechnologies, thereby limiting the freedom to operate of public and private agencies 





•  Parent germplasm in the form of individual plant varieties 
•  germplasm constructs that include trait-specific genes controlling specific “input” 
characteristics such as tolerance of biotic and abiotic stresses, output traits such as 
increased content of starch, oil, amino acids, proteins, vitamins, and minerals, or 
decreased content of traits that are harmful (for example, allergens) or contribute 
to environmental pollution (such as phytates that increase the environmental 
damage from manure), and  
•  enabling technologies that include transformation technologies by which a gene 
coding for a specific characteristic is inserted into plant cells, promoters that are 
used to control expression of the gene in plants, selectable markers that are genes 
used to determine which plant cells have been successfully transformed to show 
the desired characteristic, and gene silencing or regulating technologies that can 
be used to suppress or modify gene expression in plants. 
Depending on the complexity of the transgenic product, there can be dozens of 







  A basic understanding of the nature of intellectual property inherent in a patent is 
a prerequisite to thinking about the appropriate public R&D role in an increasingly 
proprietary agricultural science world.  Patents protect inventions of tangible things and 
confer a legally enforceable right on their owners to exclude others from practicing the 
invention described and claimed in the document.  However, these rights apply only for a 
limited period of time, generally 20 years from the date of filing, and only in a specific 
legal jurisdiction, and the scope of the property protection is circumscribed by the claims 
made in the patent.  Especially in the United States, the validity of a patent, and its scope, 
is often unclear until many years after issue, when final legal rulings are issued after a 
court challenge. 
A common misconception is that a patent awarded in one country, for example 
the United States, confers property rights in the rest of the world.  This is not so, there is 
no such thing as an “international patent.”  Patents are awarded by national governments 
and the intellectual protection conferred by a patent extends only to the national 
                                                 
5 Utility patents on inventions related to machinery, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals have been around for 
many years.  By early 2001, 111 countries with their own patent systems were signatories to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) headquartered in 
Geneva.  What is comparatively new, however, is the broadening of the scope of the protection to include 
inventions involving living things.  In the United States, the first step in this direction was taken in 1930 
with the passage of the Plant Patent Act, which protected asexually reproduced plants (like grape vines, 
fruit trees, strawberries, and ornamentals, which are propagated through cuttings and graftings).  In 1985, 
the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals ruled in ex parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ2d 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 
1985) that utility patents could protect asexually and sexually propagated seeds, plants, and tissue culture, 
although the broadening of patentable subject matter due to ex parte Hibberd (resulting in “double 
protection” by utility patents and plant variety certificates) has been challenged recently in a case involving 
Pioneer that is due to be heard late 2001.  The expansion of means to protect plants may be observed as 
well in Europe.  Plants distinguished by a single recombinant DNA sequence (as distinct from plant 
varieties per se) are now patentable in the European Union, according to a recent decision of the European 






jurisdiction in which the patent is awarded.  If an innovation is patented in the United 
States but not in, for example, Australia, then anyone is free to use it in Australia, 
although importation into the United States of a product embodying the patented IP, or 
resulting from it, might well be subject to legal challenge in the United States.  The 
nature of patents and the implications of their geographic limitations is pursued in greater 
detail in Binenbaum et al. (2000). 
To protect an innovation in more than one country, a patent must be awarded in 
each.  The cost of obtaining a patent varies from country to country; the cost of obtaining 
protection in all important markets can be very substantial--hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.  Thus, most inventions are patented in just one or a few developed countries with 
large markets; the chance that many of these patents have been awarded in developing 
countries is small.
6   
Plant breeders’ rights / Plant variety protection certificates 
The United States introduced a Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970 designed to 
strengthen intellectual property protection for varieties (that lack the natural protection 
against replanting possessed by hybrids), and are not clones protected by the Plant Patent 
Act.  Forms of plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) consistent with the International Union for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) now exist in most OECD countries, 
and since 1989 in Australia.  Developing countries are adopting either UPOV standards 
or other forms of plant variety protection to comply with the requirement of TRIPS to 
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grant a so-called sui generis form of protection to plant varieties.
7  By early 2001, a total 
of 47 countries (including, most recently, Bolivia, Brazil, China, and Kenya) have 
enacted PBR legislation.  Unfortunately, the implementations of sui generis protection 
are heterogeneous and institutionally complex (Egelyng 2000). 
To be granted a PBR, an applicant must demonstrate the variety is new, distinct 
from other varieties, and genetically uniform and stable through successive generations.
8  
The holders of a plant breeders’ right have a legal monopoly over commercialization of 
their varieties for a prescribed length of time.  Although the details of protection vary 
from country to country, in general, the sale, reproduction, and importation of new 
varieties of plants are encompassed.  Under this scheme, use of plants for further 
breeding is unrestricted, and the progeny are eligible for PBR protection provided they 
are distinct from the parents (where distinctiveness may be, in a notorious example, a 
difference in flower color in a soybean, where flower color is irrelevant commercially).   
In contrast to a patent, utility or usefulness is not required for a PBR.   
In this paper we focus on the implications of intellectual property protected by 
patents (and related commercial contracts and licenses) for freedom to operate by 
researchers at non-profit institutions.  However, it is important to remember that access to 
                                                 
7 Alston and Venner (2001) provide convincing evidence that the United States PVPA did not stimulate 
private investment in wheat breeding nor an increase in experimental and industry wheat yields as was 
intended by the Act, despite an increase in the wheat area sown to private varieties from 3 percent in 1970 
to 30 percent in the early 1990s. The PVPA apparently served primarily as a marketing tool, which might 
have increased appropriability of rents on branded cultivars, and this encouraged their diffusion, but did not 
increase their productivity.  
8 Distinctiveness is a measure of the differences in the variety’s phenotype, or physical traits, compared 
with all other protected varieties.  Uniformity is a measure of similarity among individual plants of the 
same variety.  Stability refers to the degree to which individual plants of a variety remain similar across 





intellectual property is shaped by the interactions among all available forms of 
intellectual property protection (including trade secrets and contracts, discussed briefly in 
this context by Binenbaum et al. 2000).  
 
3.  DO YOU NEED PERMISSION TO USE OTHER PEOPLE’S TECHNOLOGY? 
The nature of the patent right allows the patent holder to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing the patented invention.  The 
principal public policy rationale for patent rights is that they provide direct socially 
beneficial incentives, to innovate as well as facilitate further innovation by mandating 
public disclosure of the patented technology.  As new ideas are disseminated through 
publication, licensing, or other means, this information stimulates further rounds of 
innovation and technological advances.  Inherent in this scheme, however, is a tension 
between the goal of providing incentives for innovation and the goal of allowing 
innovators to build upon one another’s work.  Recognizing that it is desirable to allow use 
of patented processes and products for basic research purposes, countries sought to 
facilitate access and provide researchers some level of certainty of avoiding an 
infringement suit.  The means they have chosen include a statutory exemption, a common 
law (judicially fashioned) exemption, and compulsory licensing.  It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss the merits and disadvantages of each of these approaches.  Rather, 
to illustrate research access issues in concrete terms, the following discussion focuses 
primarily on the situation in the United States, which arguably has only a common law 






9  As more countries implement patent laws and engage in more basic 
research, the debate will widen over research exemptions in relationship to patent rights.  
The extent of government control in these areas is limited.  In the discussion below, we 
point out some possible ways in which exemptions can be modified, subverted or 
overridden.  
There is no general research exemption from infringement 
The right to use a patented invention for research is a concern in both non-profit 
and commercial settings.  Many, if not most, university scientists assume that patent law 
does not apply to their basic research.  This perception is reinforced by the academic 
culture.  Furthermore, governmental granting agencies and foundations in the United 
States do not claim ownership of inventions they fund, and do not solicit information 
from the applicant as to whether their research will use patented technologies.  Thus, 
academic researchers are often shocked to discover that, except for some very limited 
statutory exemptions that do not generally apply to them, there is no general research 
exemption in the United States for using other people’s patented technologies.
10   
Awareness of the consequences of using other people’s protected technologies is 
increasing in some countries.  In Australia, where much of the R&D funding emanates 
from statutory corporations seeking to fund research ultimately resulting in 
                                                 
9 European Patent Convention Draft, Article 27(B).   
10 In contrast to patents, the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA, 7U.S.C. §2321 et seq) provides for a 
research exemption.  Under the Act, a protected variety may be used and reproduced in plant breeding or 
other bona fide research.  The UPOV Convention, and most if not all of the countries that are signatories to 





commercialization, grant applicants are asked for a statement about intellectual property 
considerations (e.g., freedom to operate for the final product).   
 In the course of the development of patent law in the United States, courts have 
faced the issue of examining whether there is a research or experimental use exemption.  
Many of the cases involved infringement actions against the United States Government, 
where there is a clear absence of a profit motive for using the patented inventions.  
Overall, as long as the use was for the “legitimate interests” of the government, the courts 
held the activity was infringing.
11  In other words, when the government was using an 
invention during its normal activities, even though its activities are non-commercial, it 
was infringing.  As a rule, the Federal Circuit court, or its predecessor court, only found 
exemptions when use was for idle curiosity or purely philosophical pursuits.  In this 
landscape, research at a university or other non-profit organization, even if performed 
without any profit motive, would be infringing, as it is difficult to imagine research that is 
outside the scope of business interests (e.g., perform scientific research) of an 
organization.  So, for example, a university researcher’s use of polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) to assist in cloning a plant gene would require a license from the patentee owning 
rights to PCR.  It is unclear whether a researcher can successfully deflect a charge of 
infringement to the Government by asserting that the alleged infringing use occurred 
under the auspices of federal funding, such as a National Science Foundation grant.  It is 
possible, however, that use of PCR in educational activities might escape a finding of 
infringement (Parker and Stafford 1998). 
                                                 





The U.S. Congress has the authority to legislate a general research use exemption, 
but so far has only enacted a few very narrow exemptions.  In 1984, the Drug Price and 
Patent Term Restoration Act allowed drug companies to proceed with pre-market 
approval testing of a drug during the life of the relevant patent.
12  The main policy 
consideration that drove adoption of this exemption was to ensure that consumers 
received the advantages of generic drug prices.  Without the exemption, the patent term 
of a drug was inadvertently lengthened because a generic manufacturer could not 
otherwise begin testing a product until the patent expired.  Although not yet definitively 
resolved by the Federal Circuit Court, it is unlikely that this exemption would apply to 
patented assays or genes or other inventions that are not themselves the product for which 
government approval is being sought.  In addition, very recently Congress has legislated 
a very limited exemption for certain users of patented inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (c)(1) 
grants exemption to medical practitioners performing a medical or surgical procedure that 
would otherwise be an infringement.  Among other limitations of this exemption, it does 
not include uses of patented machines or compositions of matter, nor patented uses of 
compositions of matter, nor “practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.”   
While many commentators favor a more expansive research use exemption in the 
United States, Congress has failed to act.  A policy consideration that would drive 
enactment of such an exemption would likely be based on a need for the exemption in 
                                                 
12 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1): It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention … 
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.  However, use of 
patented herbicides to test new herbicide-tolerant cultivars, for example, would not fall within this 





order to promote continued innovation or to remove university and non-profit research 
institutions from the risk of infringement actions.  Even if there was a demonstrated need 
for an exemption, workability of an exemption could be extremely difficult given the 
often poor distinction between “pure” (non-commercial) research and research with a 
commercial interest in non-profit organizations.  This particular issue is discussed in 
more detail below.   
In jurisdictions that have adopted research exemptions, the exceptions are usually 
limited to research on improvements of the invention and do not extend to use of the 
invention in research.  For example, in Europe, the Community Patent Convention 
provides a research exemption relating to European Community patents: patent protection 
does not extend to “acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes” and “acts done 
for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention.”
13 
Even assuming that absolutely no research exemption exists, it is unlikely, 
however, that non-profit organizations have more than a very minor risk of infringement 
exposure.
14  It would be poor public relations for a patentee company to sue a non-profit 
organization for infringement, and it is likely that a jury would sympathize with the 
defendant.  In addition, the type of remedy imposed is unlikely to be severe from the 
                                                 
13 European Patent Convention Draft, Article 27(B).  Individual European Countries such as Germany, 
United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Sweden, The Netherlands and Italy have enacted laws granting 
research exemptions, many with similar language to EPC 27(B).  Interpretations of these laws indicate that 
the exemption would be restricted to research relating to invention, and would not encompass research 
using the invention. 
14 This opinion is limited to patent rights.  Recently, universities have been subject to accusations of 





institute’s point of view.  In Rocke Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,
15 a key 
experimental use exemption case, the patent owner urged that the data generated during 
the infringing activity be confiscated and destroyed.  The Court, however, expressed a 
preference for monetary damages and admonished that injunctions are an equitable 
remedy and by no means a mandatory remedy.  Although difficult to predict with 
certainty, damages owed by a non-profit infringer would likely be limited, possibly to the 
cost of a license, as use of the technology within a non-profit organization would not 
generally cause a company to lose profits.
16  Thus, weighed against the significant 
expenses of litigation, a corporation is unlikely to pursue such a suit except for very 
significant matters.  Furthermore, patentee corporations stand to gain some advantages by 
having researchers do some of their research and widely adopt technologies that the 
corporation can then license.  For example, the Center for the Application of Molecular 
Biology to International Agriculture (CAMBIA) owns rights to b-glucuronidase (GUS), 
which was widely used by researchers in non-profit organizations who ultimately moved 
to corporations and continued using GUS.  While CAMBIA grants non-commercial 
research in non-profit settings a cost-free license, fees are charged for using GUS in 
commercial research.   
In actuality, there does appear to be a de facto exemption in the United States.  
The number of patent suits filed in United States District Courts against non-profit 
organizations is extremely small.  For example, a search of patent suits recorded in the 
                                                 
15 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
16 Infringement can be very costly in the United States, since willful infringement can invoke treble 






17 uncovered a possible five lawsuits against non-profit institutions,
18 
of which two appear to be pre-emptive actions (declaratory judgments) requesting a 
finding of non-infringement, one is unclassified, and only two appear to be infringement 
suits.  Congress also does not believe that universities suffer a high or actual risk.  In 
1990, the House Committee on the Judiciary, which has jurisdiction over patent matters, 
recommended a broad research exemption,
19 but in opposing the exemption, one 
Representative questioned the need for the exemption and challenged universities to 
come forward to show how the existing patent law was harming them.
20  We assume that 
the evidence simply was not there because the exemption was never passed.  Moreover, 
in the United States, the 11
th Amendment of the Constitution protects State institutions 
from being sued in federal courts unless they consent to the suit or implicitly waive their 
immunity.  Congress attempted to subject States to infringement suits in passage of 
§296(a) of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act.  Recently, 
the United States Supreme Court found this section unconstitutional.
21  Undaunted, the 
most recent session of Congress initiated, but failed to pass, another bill to ensure that 
State entities would be subject to patent infringement laws.  Eventually, Congress is 
                                                 
17 See www.casestream.com .   
18 These suits were identified as those in which the only defendant was a “university”, “college” or 
“institute.”    The exact nature of the suits was not investigated.  Many more suits were identified in which 
a corporation was a co-defendant.  In these instances, the non-profit is likely co-joined as the owner of the 
patent and a required party in suit under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not likely to be cited as the 
infringing party.   
19 H.R. Rep. No., 960, 101st Cong., 2d  Sess. (1990). 
20 Ibid.  
21 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank et 
al.119S.Ct.2199(1999) (in which College Savings Bank filed a patent infringement suit against Florida 





likely to succeed in passing legislation that will abrogate States’ rights and withstand the 
scrutiny of the Supreme Court.   
Thus, although there is no research exemption for most non-profit institutions, it 
is unlikely that infringement suits will be filed against universities and research institutes 
regardless of their geographic location, in cases where the nature of the research is clearly 
non-commercial.   
Commercially oriented research 
While the risk of infringement liability appears to be essentially nil for non-profit 
organizations doing non-commercial research, it is the opinion of the authors that the risk 
may be higher when commercially-oriented research or services are performed.  In these 
situations, the organization may receive a letter requesting the activity cease and desist, 
an offer for a commercial license, or notice of an infringement action.  
Commercial services performed by a non-profit organization may well attract 
unwanted attention from a patent holder.  For example, in Florida Prepaid, the alleged 
infringer, an entity created by the State of Florida that administers tuition prepayment 
contracts, was sued by College Savings Bank for direct and indirect infringement of its 
patent claiming a financing methodology to guarantee investors sufficient monies to 
cover college tuition.    And several years ago, the holder of PCR patent rights contacted 
a prominent non-profit cancer research institute about a commercial license for use of 
PCR to tissue type patients, a service for which the institute charged.
22  In both of these 
examples, the organizations provided and charged for a service, which is arguably 
                                                 





indicative of a commercial activity.  Thus, activities that are commercial in nature may 
provoke patent rights holders to take some sort of action against even non-profit 
institutions.   
But what exactly is commercial research performed by non-profit organizations?  
And where is the line drawn between commercial and non-commercial research?  Some 
commentators broadly define commercial research as research having some commercial 
purpose, but in some sense this is a circular definition.  Trying instead to define non-
commercial research leads to similar difficulties.  At some level, all federally funded 
research in the United States has a commercial component due to the Bayh-Dole Act that 
encourages use of the patent system to promote a number of goals, one of which is “to 
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions….”
23  To achieve the 
goals, recipients of federal funds may retain title in any subject inventions.   
Indeed, an increasing amount of research is performed as part of a private-public 
sector alliance.  In year 2000 at one university, University of California at Berkeley, 
seven percent of externally funded research projects for research, education, and public 
service were in the form of grants of contracts from private industry (University of 
California, Berkeley 2000).  This amounted to $14 million out of a total of $430 million.  
In 1999, industry awarded $35 million out of a total of $432 million (University of 
California, Berkeley 1999).  Much of the increase in 1999 was due to a single corporate 
sponsorship at UC Berkeley that constituted over $25 million of funding for a five-year 
period.  This alliance between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute and the 
                                                 





Department of Plant and Microbial Biology has been highly publicized and much 
criticized (e.g., Press and Washburn 2000).  Some aspects of the agreement are discussed 
below.   
Non-profit organizations are not the only entities doing deals with the corporate 
world.  Substantial private-sector funding also supports research at U.S. Government 
departments under the auspices of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements 
or CRADAs (Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie 2000).  A CRADA is a contract between a 
private company and a government agency to work together on a project, in which the 
private collaborating partner agrees to provide funds, personnel, services, facilities, 
equipment or other resources needed to conduct a specific research or development effort 
while the Federal government agrees to provide similar complementary resources.  Also, 
the parties can mutually agree to keep research results emerging from the CRADA 
confidential and free from disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act for up to 5 
years.   The government and the collaborating partner may share patents and patent 
licenses, allow one partner to retain exclusive rights to a patent or patent license, or 
assign licensing rights to facilitate licensing to third-party users. CRADAs are 
specifically designed to speed the commercialization of federally developed technology. 
While CRADAs are restricting unfettered access to federally funded research, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), which, like the USDA, transfers technology through 
CRADAs, is also trying to rectify and restore access to research materials.  Recognizing 
the difficulties encountered by some researchers in obtaining access to research tools, 





Research Resources:  Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants 
and Contracts”
24 to provide encouragement and guidance for provision of access to basic 
research tools.   
 
What is “free access”? 
Given that there is some risk to using other people’s patented technologies, some 
in the non-profit research world may want express permission to use the technologies.  
As discussed in detail below, permission may be obtained in a variety of ways, but the 
recipient should be vigilant for the “hidden costs” of access.  Sometimes agreements 
widely characterized as onerous, such as the Novartis-Berkeley deal, are far less 
restrictive than apparently “free” deals and traditional consulting arrangements with 
academics.  For example, access to Monsanto’s (Pharmacia) rice genome sequence 
database has multiple restrictions, such as it is limited to publicly funded research at non-
profit research organizations and government research agencies, data downloads are 
limited to the amount of data submitted up to 26 kb per request (thereby severely 
curtailing the applications or research possible with these data), any resulting intellectual 
property, although vesting in the institution, must be reported to Pharmacia along with a 
copy of the patent filing.  Furthermore, the institution must grant Pharmacia a right to 
negotiate a non-exclusive license and agree that Pharmacia may use the research results 
in its internal programs.   
                                                 






In consulting arrangements with individual faculty, private funders typically 
retain complete control over the nature of funded research, and any resulting patents, and 
often constrain the publication of results adverse to the funders’ interests.  Frequently, 
research reagents such as cell lines, vectors, and clones, are transferred between 
investigators by material transfer agreements (MTAs).  The form of an MTA can range 
from a formal document setting out the conditions of transfer to a simple letter 
accompanying the reagent that states conditions for acceptance.  In the academic world, 
MTAs commonly specify that the materials are not to be transferred to third parties, but 
may also specify sharing of results obtained using the material, particular 
acknowledgement in publication, or even co-authorship.  We are aware of cases in which 
the sender of the material was not the originator of the material but still attempted to 
impose conditions on its transfer.   
Furthermore, since the vast preponderance of investigators in the United States as 
well as many other countries are obliged to assign all property rights to their host 
institution, we question the validity of MTAs signed only by the sender or approved only 
by the recipient investigator.  From a legal viewpoint, it is unclear whether an 
investigator alone has the authority to agree to conditions of material transfer either in or 
out of his or her institution.  Pragmatically, a cautious approach is to have an official of 
the institution sign the MTA in addition to the investigator.  That approach, by avoiding 
unwanted difficulties in the future, might well lower the overall transaction costs in the 






4.  DETERMINING FREEDOM TO OPERATE 
Even though the risk of serious consequences for infringement in a non-profit 
institution is currently quite low, as research becomes more and more commercially 
oriented the risk may well increase.  And as this risk increases, the need to scope out the 
intellectual property landscape will become more pressing.  Who will have, or ought to 
have, responsibility for determining freedom to operate (FTO) is an issue itself that is 
beyond the scope of this discussion.  In Australia, some government-supported Research 
and Development Corporations require a grant seeker to discuss FTO as part of the 
application process.  In this situation the onus is placed on the investigator, a person 
typically ill-equipped to perform the analysis and without funding to hire an attorney or a 
patent search company.  In the current environment, however, many institutions are also 
ill-equipped to analyze FTO issues.   
The discussion below outlines a few of the reasons why determining FTO can be 
a daunting task, especially for the non-legal professional.  Alternatively, determining 
FTO can be a costly task if the analysis is referred to a lawyer.  If neither of these 
scenarios is appealing to non-profit organizations, then it behooves them to investigate 
alternatives that might prove more appealing.  Some of the available options are 
presented in the last section of this article.   
Dynamic nature of patent landscape  
Any FTO analysis is by its design a snapshot of the current patent situation.  
However, patenting and disclosing inventions is a dynamic process.  For most FTO 





is a continuous stream of patents and applications being published.  In addition, new 
inventors enter an area and those already in the field add to their own intellectual 
property.  For example, in 1996, a FTO analysis was performed by one of us for a small 
start-up biotech company in the United States.  At that time, there were only a few 
players in the field, with one or two likely to emerge with the predominant rights.  Less 
than a year later, an update of the analysis revealed an extremely crowded field with 
many players and unfortunately, for the client, additional prior art that anticipated some 
of its patent claims.   
Complicating the challenges imposed by a changing landscape is the difficulty of 
determining what entity will triumph with what claims.  The first view of most patent-
type intellectual property is as a publication of a pending application.
25  A pending 
application has claims but they have not been examined or approved by any Patent 
Office.  Often the published claims are unrealistic compared with the scope that will 
ultimately be granted.  Moreover, depending on the jurisdiction, actual grant of a patent 
can be a lengthy procedure.  Of course, until grant there cannot be infringement.  That 
said, when a product is important it is not necessarily a good idea to wait until grant to try 
to license or design around the patent.   
Interpretation of claims 
The claims of a patent, and not the text, define the metes and bounds of the patent 
right conferred on the patentee.  The invention as written in the specification of the patent 
                                                 
25 Until 29 November 2000, the United States published only issued patents.  At that date, the United States 
began to publish patent applications 18 months after the earliest priority date, except in limited 
circumstances when no non-United States patents have been applied for and the applicant petitions for non-





does not establish the extent of the right.  For many reasons the claims as granted may not 
fully cover what is written in the body of the patent.
26  To delineate the extent of the 
right, claims must be interpreted.  Although claims should be interpreted according to the 
law of the jurisdiction, some basic commonalities apply.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, we refer to United States patent law. 
In the United States, claim construction is a matter of law
27 and is focused on an 
objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would 
have understood the term to mean.  In the United States, claim scope is established by 
three factors: the plain language of the claim, the specification (text of the patent) and the 
prosecution history.
28  While the specification acts as sort of a dictionary, prosecution 
history is also used to determine the true meaning of the claims, and the use of extrinsic 
evidence to aid claim construction is discretionary.  Therefore, a proper claim 
interpretation requires skill in reading claims, specification, and prosecution history.   
Infringement is determined by examining whether the alleged infringing product 
or method falls within the scope of the claims.  Even if there is no literal infringement, 
there may still be infringement under the judicially-created “doctrine of equivalents.”  
This overlay of doctrine of equivalents, which is present in some form in major 
jurisdictions (e.g., United States, Australia, Japan, and Europe) increases the difficulty of 
                                                 
26 During the examination of a patent application, the applicant may need to cancel or amend the submitted 
claims to ensure patentability.  In addition, some claims may need to be moved to a new application 
because otherwise there would be multiple inventions in a single application.  Other factors that shape 
claims include business purposes, clarity, and financial concerns. 
27 As a matter of law, judges, and not juries, determine the meaning of a claim.  See also Markman et al. v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc. et al., 517U.S. 370 (1996). 
28 The negotiation between the Patent Office and the applicant is called “prosecution”.  The record of this 





firmly determining FTO.  Very recently, however, in the United States, the Federal 
Circuit appeals court, which is the final authority on patent law except for the Supreme 
Court, has severely limited the scope of the doctrine of equivalents, abolishing all 
equivalents for claim elements that were amended for reasons of patentability during 
prosecution.
29  The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review this holding, but, at least for 
now, analyses that consider only literal infringement will afford a fair amount of 
certainty.   
Cumulative nature of biotechnologies   
The development of any product in biotechnology requires a multitude of 
technologies and reagents.  This is especially true in agricultural biotechnology, where 
the delivery system includes germplasm (usually seeds, which themselves embody the 
results of previous generations of research). Typical reagents include vectors for 
transformation of plants, components of vectors (e.g., promoters, selectable markers), 
elite plant varieties and the like.  Methodologies necessary for research and development 
include transformation of plant cells.  Because of its high profile, freedom-to-operate was 
analyzed for GoldenRice™, rice that produces a vitamin A precursor as a result of 
transformation with non-rice genes.  The analysis estimated that 70 patented technologies 
were used during research and development.  Although the number of these that is 
needed to actually practice GoldenRice is certainly somewhat less, even in the United 
States (where 44 of the total of 70 patents apply) or major European countries where the 
                                                 
29 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) cert. granted 





relevant technologies are most frequently patented, this analysis illustrates the complexity 
of intellectual property in agricultural biotechnology.   
Tools for searching patents and applications   
In addition to an FTO assessment, scientists and other researchers may want to 
examine patents as a source of scientific information.  Because companies do not always 
publish results of research that leads to patents in conventional journals, patents and 
published applications are a rich source of information on data and methods.  But how 
and where does a non-legal professional come by the information?   
Several databases
30 that contain differing amounts of information are available by 
internet access; some are by pay subscription and some are no-cost.  For non-legal 
professionals, a problem common to all the existing databases is the interface, which 
caters to individuals that have a substantial knowledge base in intellectual property.  
Another issue is the limited number of searchable fields.  Unlike the indexed scientific 
literature at the National Library of Medicine, patent publications are not indexed, forcing 
a text-based search.  While many would not be put off by the need for a text-based search 
strategy, the language used in writing patents is very stylistic and to some extent codified 
by the drafters.  A patent title may bear faint resemblance to the subject matter.  For 
example, many published patent applications lodged at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) office bear the title “Secreted human proteins.”  Furthermore, with 
                                                 
30 A non-inclusive list of databases includes:  CAMBIA (www.cambiaIP.org); United States Patent and 
Trademark Office <www.uspto.gov>; Delphion Network <www.delphion.com >; Yet2 <www.yet2.com>; 
European Patent Office <ep.dips.org>; Dialog <www.dialog.com >; Micropatent <www.micropatent.com>; 





the exception of the CAMBIA database, none provides an explanation about patents, how 
to read a patent, or other information to assist the naïve user.   
Infrastructure in non-profit institutions 
An additional hurdle for non-profit organizations and their investigators is the 
lack of in–house infrastructure.  Technology transfer offices appear mostly to be staffed 
by individuals whose job it is to out-license technology and raise money for the host 
institution.  A perusal of the staff directory of these offices reveals very few patent 
attorneys.  Non-attorneys may be well-versed in patent interpretation and reading, but this 
is difficult to confirm from the information provided on the internet by offices.  As with 
most administrative departments, these offices operate on a limited budget.  It is unlikely 
that many will have the resources to perform or contract for detailed freedom-to-operate 
analyses.   
5.  OPTIONS FOR ACCESSING OTHER PEOPLE’S TECHNOLOGY 
There are various options for gaining access to proprietary technologies.  Some of 
the more important ones are discussed here, mainly from the perspective of a non-profit 
agency.  Some emphasis is given to those operating in less-developed countries, although 
most of the issues discussed are relevant in rich countries too. 
  Cross licensing 
This is a popular solution for deals among biotech oligopolists.  Australia is 
typical and instructive.  “We discovered that research capacity alone was not enough. 
Research concepts and unpublished data were sometimes interesting for our Industry 





breakthrough came when the CRC for Plant Science started to take out patents.  Patents 
are property; property is valuable (or so prevailing wisdom then suggested), and therefore 
it can be traded.  It was as if we had suddenly, almost magically, acquired a stack of chips 
and could get our feet under the card table.  It was then that the tactic of progressive 
engagement started to pay off” (Buller and Taylor 1999).  Similarly, when the Crop 
Development Center of the University of Saskatchewan developed a commercially viable 
transgenic flax cultivar, its possession of a U.S. patent on a biolistic transformation 
process for flax was reportedly important for negotiations to obtain freedom to operate 
(Stovin and Phillips 2000, p. 687). 
In universities, cross licensing is often precluded by the nature of contracts for 
compensation of university innovators.  In contrast to most U.S. corporations, U.S. 
universities generally have established rules that grant a substantial share of licensing 
revenues to their employees who patent valuable innovations and other universities in 
other OECD countries are following their lead.
31  Many other public and nonprofit 
institutions have similar rules.  (See, for example, Phillips and Gustafson 2000, table 13 
p. 72, for a dramatic contrast between for-profit and public biotech research institutions 
in Saskatchewan, Canada.)  
Some CGIAR centers have entered into contractual arrangements with other 
agencies, but the number and nature of those contracts is unknown at present.  In any 
case, at CG centers, licensing would have to be restricted to property other than landraces 
and other plant varieties designated as “in trust” material under a 1994 agreement with 
                                                 
31 Normile (1998) describes changes in Japanese patent law that increase the possible rewards for 





the United Nation’s FAO, which they are committed to make available to the world at 
large.  Through an MTA, recipients of in-trust material agree not to seek intellectual 
property protection on that material but may seek protection for derivatives.   
Despite these severe constraints, candidates for cross-licensing have already been 
nominated.  The near-isogenic lines of rice germplasm developed at the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) headquartered in the Philippines, potentially useful in 
plant breeding, are examples of technology that might be licensed via an MTA or other 
contractual agreement.  Fischer and Barton (1999) propose a model MTA that offers such 
material at no cost in exchange for access to information about subsequent discoveries 
(after a lag to allow applications for patents), and zero-cost non-exclusive research 
licenses to Centers of the CGIAR and agricultural research agencies operating in less-
developed countries (LDCs).  Further, they propose that a non-exclusive license for 
commercialization shall be granted to the research centers at a reasonable royalty and at 
zero cost for subsistence agricultural and other uses not in competition with the private 
sector.  Whether such initiatives can be pursued successfully at sufficiently low cost in 
money and managerial resources is an open question. 
If the above example leads to successful cross licensing, it is likely to be the 
exception that proves the rule.  The number and value of intellectual property chips held 
by most public agencies operating in or for LDCs (and particularly those operating in the 
poorer parts of the developing world) that might provide a basis for bargaining with the 
private sector is often overstated.  For example, in 1998 the CG Centers collectively spent 





held few patents (probably less than 10 in total, and most unrelated to biotechnologies 
nor granted in developed-country jurisdictions).  Contrast this with Monsanto who spent 
$1,263 million on R&D that same year (Security and Exchange Commission 1998) and 
was granted a total of 437 U.S. patents during the five years 1994-1998.  Moreover, the 
650,000 accessions of crop and tree species conserved in the CG’s 11 genebanks do not 
constitute the set of bargaining chips or negotiating assets that Byerlee and Fisher (2001) 
and others seem to suggest.  Since 1994 the CG Centers have undertaken to make most of 
this material freely available to all by way of an in-trust agreement with the United 
Nation’s FAO, effectively taking it out of contention as a basis for bargaining with the 
private sector.  Even if that agreement were modified, Koo, Pardey, and Wright (2001) 
estimate that although the CG conserves around 30-40 percent of the unique accessions 
held in the world’s 1,300 or so genebanks, much of this material is duplicated and 
therefore available elsewhere. The CGIAR does have some possible bargaining chips, 
including its goodwill, access to local institutions involved in the generation and transfer 
of technologies, and non-designated germplasm, in the form of breeding lines and other 
material not designated under the FAO Trust Agreement having traits with potential 
value in commercial markets.  The latter are significant only for the major crops that have 
been subject to intensive breeding efforts. 
For public research organizations that are acting independently, cross licensing 
tends to be much more a part of the problem than of the solution.  As the agricultural 
biotech industry matures, it is becoming like many other industries where each major 





But none…usually brings suit…because each knows that the defendant would respond 
with a counterattack based on those of the defendant’s patents that it is infringing.  
Litigation is too much like a nuclear weapon, and the relation becomes one of mutual 
assured destruction...But…there is no reason not to use the portfolio against possible new 
entrants who might affect the oligopoly rents available to the industry leaders” (Barton 
2000, p.8).  Public or nonprofit researchers might well find themselves, like potential 
private entrants, shut out by the oligopoly defended by cross-licensing agreements.   
Research only licenses and their pitfalls 
For scientists, research-only licenses might be attractive, as they allow them to 
pursue their intellectual interests using state-of-the-art technology.  The U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) urges provision of such licenses gratis, and indeed such 
licenses are often freely available.  Furthermore, a research license might generate 
externalities to the licensee in the form of learning-by-doing, and more generally, the 
development of intangible research capacities that might reduce future dependence on 
proprietary technology.  
However, a free research license that does not permit commercialization can make 
a research tool the “cuckoo’s egg” of technology transfer.  If the project succeeds, then 
the bargaining for permission to commercialize (or release to users at no cost) the fruits 
of the research effort must begin.  The fact that the researchers have already incurred the 
“sunk cost” of all the research expenditures places them in a highly disadvantageous 
bargaining position.  On the other hand, the holder of the intellectual property right, even 





downstream applications that it can use for its own purposes.  In the extreme, the license 
holder might be able to appropriate for itself the full value of the research output of the 
licensee, gross of the latter’s costs.  
In some circumstances the situation might be more favorable to the licensee.  If 
dissemination of successful innovations based on proprietary technology to users in 
certain markets offers little commercial benefit, a private licensor might be persuaded to 
license such dissemination gratis to a licensee with noncommercial objectives (for 
example, elimination of hunger among the poor) if it sees some kind of benefit, such as 
an enhanced public image, from doing so.  This is discussed further below. 
Market segmentation strategies  
Before discussion of this strategy in detail, it is crucial to emphasize that this is 
not a passive strategy.  Rather, it entails devotion of substantial high-quality resources for 
successful implementation. 
A survey by Cohen et al. (1998) caused some concern when it revealed that CG 
Centers are already using research tools and other inputs that are subject to intellectual 
property rights.  What was not obvious from the survey was how many of these were 
subject to intellectual property in the locations in which Centers operate.  All the Centers 
engaged in agricultural research are in less-developed economies.  Patents usually are 
filed in, at most, a select group of countries.  Indeed, until recently, few third world 
countries allowed patents on life forms.  In many cases, research tools and genetic 
material, and especially plant cultivars, are not covered by patents in the host countries of 





and corporations in many, if not most, cases have not obtained patent protection beyond 
certain OECD countries.  Where no patents are held, there can be no infringement. 
To the extent that research agencies use technologies and cultivars that are not 
patented or otherwise protected where they are made, they can and should legally proceed 
without obtaining permission from the holder of the intellectual property rights.  Even 
after compliance with TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property treaty), the 
breeding of new cultivars using prior cultivars protected in developed countries may be 
legal under the sui generis protection that is being adopted in many LDCs.  These 
cultivars and associated genetic material might not be legally imported into countries 
where they are subject to patent claims.  But most of the staple food crops of importance 
for LDCs are largely consumed domestically, as discussed in detail in Binenbaum et al. 
(2000).  Hence the new regime of the World Trade Organization might facilitate a kind of 
indirect market segmentation, in which LDCs get the new technology for free, and 
proprietary claims are enforced in developed countries.  Further, cultivars incorporating 
genes patented in LDCs may not be subject to effective intellectual property claims if 
those countries have neither the legal means nor the will to enforce them (Giannakas 
2001).  If the policies of agencies like the CG centers operating in LDCs preclude 
violation of legally valid but practically unenforceable claims, they might consider 
arranging for their domestic NARS collaborators to address domestic intellectual 
property concerns.   
For the near term, research agencies in LDCs are likely to have considerable 





most of the technology useable by the CGIAR and its LDC partners over the next half-
decade or so is likely to be unencumbered by relevant intellectual property rights.  But it 
would be hazardous to assume general freedom to operate; mistakes could result in 
catastrophic legal liability.  To reliably implement a strategy of obtaining intellectual 
property only where necessary, those who make research commitments must have access 
to adequate information on patent rights, and to expert legal counsel.  Such access is not 
widely available at present on an international basis, and does not exist for most LDC 
researchers and research institutions.  
A promising initiative to provide intellectual property information services for 
third-world research organizations is being pursued by the nonprofit corporation 
CAMBIA in Australia.  The aim is to develop interactive software that can help 
researchers to identify prior patent claims and identify areas of freedom to operate and 
thus travel more safely through the international patent minefield.  This type of initiative 
requires access to personnel with wide experience in international patenting and patent 
negotiations. Such expertise is quite expensive.  If adequately funded on a continuing 
basis, it could make further international collaboration more feasible by mitigating the 
difficulties caused by uncertainty about prior claims to useful biotechnology.
32   
                                                 
32 For the CGIAR (as well as agencies in developing countries heavily reliant on donor funding), a possible 
drawback of this strategy is that one motivation for developed-country donor support might be prospective 
spin-offs of research for farmers in their own countries (Tribe 1991). These have been shown to be very 
valuable for the United States, Australia, and Canada in wheat and rice (Brennan and Fox 1995; Pardey et 
al. 1996; Thomas 1996).  To the extent that CGIAR technology is subject to intellectual property rights in 
such countries, the technologies will not be available locally without appropriate licensing. Although such 
licensing might still leave them with a major share of the benefits, it could decrease the enthusiasm of 
developed-country donors (especially those that are not home to holders of strong IPR in this area) for such 






There is widespread apprehension that ignoring the rights of intellectual property 
holders, even in jurisdictions where they are not valid, could, in at least some cases, incur 
significant costs, such as loss of fruitful collaborations with the same entities in other 
areas, and possible loss of support from developed-country donors.  However, when 
private firms are assessing freedom to operate, they ordinarily ignore patents where they 
are not legally valid in a given jurisdiction, and expect their competitors to do likewise.  
Donors should not try to bully nonprofit researchers into respecting claims that would be 
considered irrelevant in the private sector, nor should researchers feel legally or morally 
obligated to enter into such agreements.  On the other hand, researchers should 
understand that a cost of using processes or products covered by patents in OECD 
countries is that none of the relevant innovation, including testing and evaluation, can be 
conducted where the patents are valid.  Thus some of the benefits of research 
collaboration with agencies located in OECD countries will be foreclosed.  In addition, 
users of biotechnology innovations or products incorporating such biotechnology might 
export to countries where patents on the innovations are valid.  In practice, such South-
North trade is not very important for most staple food crops, as demonstrated via analysis 
of bilateral trade data in Binenbaum et al. (2000). 
Markets for intellectual property can also be segregated on grounds other than 
geography.  With technology licenses, common segmentation strategies include 
delineating fields of use (e.g., including or excluding particular crops), length of time 
(e.g., renewable term or end of patent life), certain claims of a patent, limitations to 





third-party services.  Another option is to charge license fees based on an ability to pay or 
expectation of the profit streams, thus distinguishing between commercial or non-
commercial uses and small startup entities (be they in LDCs or developed countries) 
versus large national or multinational corporations. 
Lanjouw (2001) has developed a highly creative initiative for market 
segmentation of pharmaceuticals (such as drugs for global diseases like cancer of heart 
disease) with large potential markets in both developed and less-developed countries.  By 
her proposal, (discussed in Phillips 2001, Mallaby 2001) patent applicants in, for 
example, the United States would have to commit not to enforce their patents in a 
designated list of developing countries when they apply for a “foreign filing license” with 
the United States Patent and Trade Mark Office.  This license is a routine requirement for 
filing in other countries.  Producers would effectively be asked to choose between 
enforcing their patents in developed countries or developing countries but not both.  The 
incentive to develop drugs for diseases that are specific to developing countries such as 
anti-malarial drugs would not be greatly affected.  In developed countries, this initiative 
would require only an amendment to national patent legislation; no amendment of 
international agreements is needed.  It would be highly desirable if plant biotechnology 
could be included in this initiative. 
Mergers or joint ventures 
As Barton (2000, p.9) notes, “[M]ergers leading to oligopoly may often be an 
appropriate mechanism of avoiding a patent fight—the merger is the ultimate cross-





the private cost of transactions in intellectual property used in research (see, for example, 
Marco and Rausser 2000.)  They can also lead to the private benefits (and public costs) of 
monopoly.  Mergers and outright privatization of previously public research agencies 
have been a feature of public sector agricultural R&D reforms in some countries like the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the past decade or so (Alston, Pardey, and 
Smith 1999).  However, much of this change seems to have been driven by policy 
reforms and public budget cuts, not by a consideration of IP issues per se.  For many 
public research institutions in LDCs, including the CGIAR, privatization is neither 
feasible nor necessarily desirable at this time.   
Joint ventures are often viewed as a more promising and flexible alternative.  
Monsanto is marketing transgenic cotton in China in a joint venture with a provincial 
public seed-producing organization; their ongoing experience promises to be quite 
instructive if not necessarily profitable. In 1992/3 the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organization in Australia undertook a joint research venture with 
Monsanto to incorporate the company’s Bt technology into locally adapted cotton 
varieties, which are being marketed through an exclusive licensing agreement by Cotton 
Seed Distributors, Australia’s largest supplier of commercial cotton seed.  In the United 
States, CRADAs (mentioned above) have in some cases been very successful, but also 
controversial, as the development of Taxol as a lucrative anti-cancer drug by Bristol-






Cost-free licensing of technologies   
For many crops other than wheat, maize, some kinds of rice, soybeans, and 
barley, private (and public) intellectual property rights holders might be persuaded to 
allow IARCs, and public research agencies in developing countries, to develop 
proprietary biotechnology for use by farmers without any direct compensation.  This 
could be true where there is obviously little risk to the significant commercial markets 
that are the focus of the intellectual property rights holders’ hopes for profits.  Staple 
crops for poor consumers have low income elasticities of demand, and most will never 
have large commercial markets even if poor consumers’ incomes increase.   As 
consumers gain wealth, they will substitute more desirable foods, including wheat and 
meat. 
Already, there are well-publicized cases of provision of technology without 
charge in these non-commercial crops, including several under the auspices of the 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA).  
Monsanto Corporation has made its technology available to achieve virus resistance in 
several non-commercial potato cultivars popular among the poor in Mexico (Qaim 1998).  
It has also supported the incorporation of virus resistance technology in yams in Africa.  
AstraZeneca (now Syngenta) and Monsanto have announced they will make technology 
for the Vitamin A rice, currently under development, available gratis for subsistence 
farmers (specifically, those earning less than $10,000 per year from farming) in 
developing countries (Trait 2000).  Such collaborations might become increasingly 





transgenic seeds continues to grow.  Technology that helps solve nutritional deficiencies 
or addresses health problems of poor consumers could generate especially desirable 
publicity.  To encourage private sector participation, it might be very important that ways 
be found to protect the commercial provider from blame, loss of reputation, or liability 
for misuse of their technology, hazards that might seem especially serious in countries 
lacking effective regulatory oversight of technology testing and use in farmers fields.  
On the other hand, it is possible that the publicity surrounding recent technology 
“donations” could lead to an unduly sanguine assessment of corporate generosity with 
respect to their intellectual property rights.
33  In the cases referenced above, it seems that 
few if any relevant and valid patents were involved.  For example, even though 70 
patents were identified by Kryder, Kowalski, and Krattiger (2000) as relevant to Vitamin 
A rice technology, the authors report that none is valid in Bangladesh, Thailand, 
Myanmar, Iran, Nigeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Malaysia.  Though some of the patents are 
valid in the United States (44 patents) and Japan (21), and some developing countries 
such as China (11), Indonesia (6), India (5), Vietnam (9), and the Philippines (1), many 
(26 of the total of 70) are methods patents that apply only to conduct of research activities 
as distinct from composition of matter patents that restrict production, sale, or 
importation of the transformed seed.  
Of course, even if proprietary technology is made available, public agencies must 
in turn assess the appropriateness of the technology for their organizations.  For example, 
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the CGIAR decided against adoption of “terminator” technology that prevents seed 
saving for re-planting (CGIAR Secretariat 1998, p.53).  Whether this was a judicious 
decision—beyond its political benefits—for LDCs is less obvious than many assumed 
(Srinivasan and Thirtle 2000).  Monsanto abandoned commercialization of the 
technology in October 1999 (Kaiser 1999), though neither its erstwhile takeover target, 
Delta and Pine Land Corporation, nor the United States Department of Agriculture, 
seems to have followed its lead. 
Direct programmatic research support from the private sector 
Rather than cooperate in the piecemeal technology transfer described above, for-
profit corporations might be persuaded to give more general support to collaboration with 
public research.  Important examples of such support on the part of corporations with 
significant market power have already been observed.  In the genomics field, a 
consortium of corporations has supported creation of a public database of genome 
markers called single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), in preference to partaking in a 
competing private-sector initiative (Marshall 1998a).  The motivation for this type of 
expenditure, which does not appear to be conditioned on any claim to property rights, is 
not clear.  But it indicates that the private firms might, on occasion, choose to support 
public over private research initiatives in areas complementary to their own endeavors. 
Another example (discussed in a different context above) is the involvement of a 
foundation funded by the multinational life science corporation, Novartis, in the support 
of plant biology research at the College of Natural Resources at the University of 





first to negotiate the rights (as distinct from right of first refusal of licenses) to 
innovations arising out of research in plant biology that is supported by the donor, and the 
donor also has rights to appoint a minority of the board that directs research funded by 
the Foundation (Mena and Sanders 1998).  But despite prominent expressions of concern 
the conditions seem surprisingly mild, given the significant commitment (five years at $5 
million per year), and in particular much less stringent than appears in typical private-
sector contracts with individual researchers.  For example, in the agreement, the Novartis 
Foundation gets rights to first negotiation for only a portion of the patentable discoveries.  
Moreover, Novartis does not control the research done with its support, beyond the 
appointment of two members of a five-person committee that decides on allocation of the 
Foundation’s funds to individual projects.  Knowledgeable observers conjecture that a 
major portion of the return envisaged by Novartis consists of the benefits of intimate 
access to the intellectual resources of the Berkeley campus. 
A third example is the donation by Monsanto Corporation of technology for 
transformation of corn (maize) by Agrobacterium technology to the University of 
California.  As part of a divestiture of assets ordered by the U.S. Justice Department as a 
condition for acquisition of DeKalb, the seed producer, Monsanto was required to 
relinquish one of two means of transformation it possessed.  Rather than sell to a 
competitor, Monsanto, under extreme time pressure, was persuaded to give it to the 
University, and the University is free to license access to the technology to third parties.  
The details of this case illustrate the important point that prospective recipients must 





is interesting that Monsanto was willing to make this donation soon after the Berkeley-
Novartis agreement was announced.  Apparently, Monsanto does not view Berkeley as 
“captured” by its competitor, Novartis.) 
Although, in some cases, donations could be motivated by the prospect of tax 
deductions in exchange for unused and perhaps useless technology, the above examples 
suggest that it is conceivable that corporations would be willing to exchange access to 
valuable technology for close contacts with the innovative activities and expertise of non-
profits, without making demands for exclusive proprietary rights to the output.  Non-
profits should search for means of making this kind of transfer easy for the private sector.  
But they must clearly establish the continued independence of their research mission 
from undue private-sector influence.  The threat of such influence is real.  Recently, 
disturbing (though not conclusive) new evidence appeared regarding the bias that can be 
induced by private funding of research.  For example, Thomas S. Bodenheimer stated that 
a review of drug trials showed that when the drug owner funded the study, the drug was 
highly rated in 89 percent of cases versus only 61 percent for independent studies (Hilts 
2000).
34 
Patent pooling  
Given the proliferation of IPRs associated with crop breeding and related 
activities, it will increasingly be necessary to obtain freedom to operate from multiple 
                                                 
34 Likewise, Barnes and Bero (1998) examined 106 articles reviewing evidence on the effects of passive 
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than those without industry affiliations.  Similarly, Stelfox et al. (1998) showed that authors who supported 
the use of a certain kind of drug for treating heart ailments were significantly more likely to have a 





patentees from various countries.  Just as the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) located in Mexico is concerned about giving its 
technology away if its value might be appropriated by the holder of a blocking patent on 
a complementary technology (Dalton 2000), corporations are concerned about offering 
their technology with a no-cost license only to find that their largesse has increased the 
rents accruing to a less generous owner of another essential enabling technology.  One 
way to avoid this is to obtain a joint grant of freedom to operate in certain markets from 
all holders of relevant intellectual property rights. 
For more than 150 years in the United States, “patent pools” have been formed 
either voluntarily or with the involvement of the U.S. Government to affect and shape 
industries.  A patent pool is an aggregation of intellectual property rights that are cross 
licensed and licensed to third parties (Clark et al. 2000).  Because of the potentiality that 
a patent pool can be anti-competitive, pools are scrutinized by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission.  In 1995, these two agencies issued a set of 
guidelines that set forth policies and examples of acceptable and unacceptable patent 
pools (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1995).  The two 
critical features of an acceptable pool are:  (a) the pool “integrate[s] complementary 
patent rights”, and (b) the “resulting competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by 
competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program.”
35  Thus, patents in the pool 
must be essential to practice the technology.  This requirement may be too big a hurdle 
for agricultural biotechnology for several reasons, not the least of which is that some very 
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basic and presumably blocking patents still have not issued because they are subject to 
ongoing interference proceedings in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
36 
Such joint agreement is probably infeasible as a regular modus operandi for 
pooling technologies on a one-by-one basis.  Far better to coordinate a joint commitment 
by the major biotechnology providers and public agencies (including the CGIAR) to 
provide royalty-free licenses on all intellectual property rights in agreed areas of 
application (distinguished for example by crop, cultivars, regions, or mode of 
production).  Such licenses could perhaps include a provision for a set of royalty 
payments to come in force should an owner of a complementary technology used in 
development of a cultivar demand a positive royalty in the relevant area of application.  
In negotiating and drafting any such agreement, attention should be paid to the 
implications of national antitrust laws.  This type of negotiation is difficult and costly to 
all parties, and requires high-quality legal advice.  General effective multi-party 
agreements on technology access are more complex and difficult to achieve than many 
donors might imagine. 
Clearinghouse mechanisms 
An alternate means of lowering the cost of transactions of technology in 
biotechnology is the creation of an internet-based clearinghouse.  This would have the 
capacity to identify relevant intellectual property in specified technology environments, 
and identify its availability and how they could be accessed.  It could also establish prices 
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or pricing indicators, facilitate negotiations and offer mechanisms for arbitration of 
disputes and monitoring of compliance. An agricultural biotechnology IP clearinghouse 
could bundle together sets of complementary patents from different patent holders into 
complete “biotechnology or agronomic systems” contracts (thus providing upstream 
technology aggregation). Through active pursuit of such “syndication” strategies it would 
be possible to create customized licenses that could greatly increase the use of inventors’ 
technologies and make multi-patent technology systems readily available and affordable 
to researchers (Graff et al. 2001). 
Ally with independent developers of research tools 
A quite different approach is to sponsor creation of substitutes to existing 
proprietary research paths.  This is a task beyond the resources of many non-profits 
(especially those operating in developing countries) operating on their own.  But 
promising collaborators do exist.  For example, CAMBIA in Australia aims to generate 
new biotechnology tools for agriculture, unencumbered by restrictive proprietary claims.  
These tools are in turn made available on an ability-to-pay basis.  The licensing revenues 
are used to fund further research and to support transfer of the technologies to developing 
countries.   
Increasingly, the technology paths pursued by plant breeders are being influenced 
according to their degree of appropriateness by for-profit innovators.  Most likely, other 
paths can be found that score low on appropriateness but high on effectiveness.  The 
discovery of a cheap antibiotic cure for stomach ulcers as a superior alternative to 





this innovation arose on the extreme fringe of mainstream medical research, beyond the 
support of the pharmaceutical establishment.)  University, government, and other 
nonprofit collaborators are well placed to pursue such opportunities, if they can be 
sufficiently insulated from powerful private-sector counterparts.  
Pressing for sharing of technology 
The kinds of challenges that proprietary claims pose to public-private 
collaboration in biotechnology are not unique to agricultural applications, and will take 
time to resolve.  They belong to two broad classes.  On the one hand are issues of access 
to innovations useful in biotechnology, which are shared by all other researchers in this 
general field.  On the other hand, problems posed to crop breeders by “farmers’ rights” 
are similar in nature (but not in degree) to those faced by pharmaceutical researchers 
interested in access to biodiversity products.  These two classes of problems require 
different approaches.  
Access to research tools is a burning issue at the heart of nonprofit research on 
biotechnology in the United States, the world leader in this area.  Public funding of 
biotechnology in the United States (and, indeed, scientific research funding in general) is 
dominated by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  Agricultural researchers might 
find the report of the NIH Working Group on Research Tools instructive, if not 
dismaying (NIH 1998).  The report notes that “although competitive pressures have 
always given scientists an incentive to withhold new research tools from their rivals, past 
practices allowed for relatively free exchange, typically without formal agreements and 





seems to be increasingly common, however, for the terms of these agreements to interfere 
with the widespread dissemination of research tools among scientists, either because 
owners and users are unable to reach agreement on fair terms or because the negotiations 
are difficult and cause protracted delays” (NIH 1998, Executive Summary p. 1-2).
37   
The Working Group’s recommendations include free dissemination of research 
tools where possible, use of the Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement 
(UBMTA), and development of guidelines for reasonable terms of licenses and MTAs.  It 
is clear that biotechnology’s intellectual property transactions will continue to be 
problematic, even when all parties are domestic and share NIH funding. 
There is a worldwide perception of the leadership of the United States in setting 
the pace for the evolution of intellectual property rights.  In the views of some, the 
evolution has proceeded too far, for example in the patenting of gene sequences.  
However, the United States Patent Office has recently responded by increasing the utility 
requirement for patenting gene sequences by requiring the applicant to identify a function 
for the gene (Enserink 2000).  Thus, the genome sequences determined by companies or 
non-profit institutions are unpatentable unless a practical use for the sequence is known.  
This is not to say that the sequences will be in the public domain though, because they 
can be treated as trade secrets and accessible only to those willing to pay the going fees 
and agreeing to the license terms for access and use.   Clearly, international research 
institutions (and public agencies elsewhere in the world) have an interest in following the 
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current debate in the United States and Europe.  As shown above, the public debates 
about patenting do influence patenting standards.  Thus, these institutions should 
continue to press for inclusion of the interests of international and developing country 
nonprofit research collaborations in measures designed to address the interests of 
domestic research institutions in the leading countries, including the European Union and 
the United States.  The CGIAR Centers are well placed to assist this effort by 
coordinating advocacy of the interests of international agricultural research institutions, 
and the FAO has a central role in the broader policy deliberations. 
One form of pressure is a boycott of companies demanding “unreasonable” terms 
for key enabling technology.  This tactic, discussed by Lesser (1999) with respect to plant 
breeding, would clearly be ludicrous for most non-profits (including the CGIAR) acting 
on their own.  But this tactic appears to have been used with some effect by NIH in a 
protracted struggle with DuPont over the terms of research licensing of a “research tool,” 
mice genetically engineered with the patented “cre-lox” system (Marshall 1998b).  
Significantly, the compromise ultimately hammered out excluded not only commercial 
use but also “any activity associated with higher plants or agricultural applications” (NIH 
1999).  Making common cause with more powerful allies (such as NIH) in applying 
pressure on holders of intellectual property might help ensure that in future agreements, 
any concessions by holders of proprietary rights are extended to international agricultural 






6.  CONCLUSION 
Non-profit access to proprietary biotechnologies used in agricultural research is a 
growing problem.  As more countries become compliant with TRIPs, an increasing 
number of innovators seek protection for their intellectual property in these markets, and 
the lines between non-profit and commercial research become more blurred, designing 
policies and operating procedures to ensure sufficient freedom to operate for public 
science will become important for public agencies the world over.  Freedom to operate 
will be crucial for public agencies in the developed and developing world intent on 
developing improved seed varieties and other technologies destined for commercial 
release, albeit in markets that may generate large social gains but are not necessarily 
privately profitable.  Various options were canvassed in this paper to improve the 
efficiency of public-private relationships, particularly options that could lower the 
transactions costs of tapping proprietary technologies for the furtherance of public 
research. 
Paradoxically, for developing countries the short-run importance of freedom to 
operate has been exaggerated by well-publicized donations that generate inferences that 
the multinational life science oligopoly holds extensive blocking intellectual property in 
those countries.  Ironically, in developed countries non-profit researchers often believe 
themselves exempt from infringement when using protected intellectual property.  
Worldwide, institutions need to better understand their rights and responsibilities 





As things stand now, intellectual property does not appear to be the binding 
constraint on Southern science.  Lack of local investment in science and limited 
experience and expertise in accessing, using, and regulating modern biotechnologies are 
the real problems.  Nevertheless the implementation of TRIPs will affect the freedom to 
operate in the next generation of biotechnology.  Guiding these changes in intellectual 
property regimes and responding creatively to the new environment are pressing 
challenges for those interested in the future of scientific research, including agricultural 
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